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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
CONFLICT THEORIES AND LIFE INSURANCE SETTLEMENTS
By
PERLIE P. FALLON*
Since an urge for useful adaptation of the law creates the problems in the con-
flicts field, an instinct for adaptation plays a larger part in the solutions than
scientific exactness or theoretical excellence, qualities, which help in the problems
only when they create a finer capacity of adaptation resulting in 'either an im-
provement in the administration of justice or an extension of beneficial commercial
activity, and we expect to find in this field of th'e law, therefore, many counsels
of perfection, the disregard of suggested changes, and a progress arising from
tentative action as in the history of equity.
The day to day transactions of a life insurance business that is national in
scope require an inherent capacity of adaptation to varying law. Life insurance
operates upon a sectional if not a national geographical basis; the corporate powers
that the state of incorporation granted to the company are exercised in many states.
The operation of the business thus becomes a continuous crossing and recrossing of
state lines. The application may be written in the state of the applicant's residence
and transmitted to the home office, which is usually in the state of origin of the cor-
poration, and where the insurer issues the policy and sends it out for delivery. The
relevance of state lines does not 'end when the process of writing the insurance
is completed; the people who are interested move about. They cross state lines;
when policies mature beneficiaries and holders of options may reside in a different
state from that in which the agent wrote the application and different from that of
the insurer's place of incorporation. The thesis which I have stated may, therefore,
be examined in relation to life insurance with the expectation that comparisons
and contrasts invite.
I propose to develop the thesis by these steps:
1. A brief reference to the precedents and theoretical thought in the general
field.
2. A resume of the theoretical thought in the insurance field.
3. A reference to the elements that are peculiar to insurance.
4. A reference to the case law in the insurance field.
5. A reference to a group of cases relating to the nature of insurance
settlements.
The thesis may not be explicit in reference to the process of adaptation. If
we speak of altering the law, adjusting the law, or qualifying the law, we fly in
* Clark University A.B.; Columbia University LL.B.; member of the Bar of the State of
New York; member of the Bar of the United States Supreme Court.
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the face of certainty. An attempt has indeed been made to settle the problems
by approaching the law in terms of fixations through the process of finding the
sovereign which fixes the law. "Qualification," however, is a synonym for adapta-
tion and qualification is a word that is not unknown in the conflicts field. Adapta-
tion has a deep root here since it looks on law as a social value that is useful for
the purpose of reconciling interests. Adapation is a good word, therefore, if
we think in terms of the material out of which the problems arise and the objective
toward which we strive. The phrase "choice of law" suggests a certain freedom.
It has in it the idea of adaptation. Adaptation gets away from implacable
standards that allow no free play for what we discover through trial and error.
John Dewey has spoken somewhere of the omnipresent necessity of vital adapta-
tion.
The precedents in the conflicts field hardly ever accept an exclusive theory
of decision; even where they alight rather than hover, they are never narrow.
There is never any fixed standard of approach. If we disregard some exceptions,
which are found in the federal decisions after Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,' we may
say that the courts in the conflicts field avoid the mechanical. The vital spirit
of continuous readaptation requires the plastic rather than the immutable and the
process of finding the law in this field, recognizing the plastic as essential to its
function, retains an inherent power of adaptation as a key for the unlocking of
the problem.
The material over which the conflicts process works in the field of contract
law and to a large extent in the field of torts is that of commercial activity. Com-
mercial activity is inherently a process of adaptation. Law is a form of order
and foresight which makes beneficial commercial activity possible. It was Chief
Justice John Marshall who saw the rivers of the younger nation as the high-
ways of an empire; it was Chief Justice Stone who regarded the processes of the
conflict of laws as growing pains.2
The basic case precedents in the general conflicts field are malleable-they
are susceptible of being fashioned; they are ductil-they are capable of being con-
tinuously drawn out; they are plastic-they are capable of being molded; they are
pliable, impressionable.
In Robinson v. Bland,s Lord Mansfield after referring to the place of making
and to the place of performance gave special emphasis to the law which the parties
had contemplated at the time they made the agreement. In that case a bill of
exchange given in Paris for money lent and money lost at play was payable in
England. The law of both France and England made the agreement void in re-
1 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). The rule was extended to insurance
in Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins .Co., 304 U. S. 202, 58 Sup. Ct. 860, 82 L. Ed. 1290 (1938).
2 Paul A. Freund: Chief Jastice Stone and The Conflict of Laws, 59 HAv. L. REv. 1210 (1946).
3 2 Burr. 1077, IWBL 234, 256 (1760). A discussion of the influence of this case is
found in Beale, CONFLICT OF LAws, § 332.5.
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spect to the money lost at play but each recognized the validity of the obligation
for money lent. Since the bill covered both money lent and money lost it was v6id
as security; however the counts for money lent were good. The test of the parties'
intent was the least mechanical of the possible approaches; it gave the greatest
possible play to the judicial process.
In Carnegie v. Morrison,4 Chief Justice Shaw was dealing with more than
a conflicts issue-the case suggested a contract for the benefit of a third person.
The agent of the defendants who were residents of England gave a letter of credit
in Boston to Bradford to enable Bradford to pay a debt which he owed to the
plaintiffs who were resident in Sweden. The plaintiffs drew a bill on the defend-
ants and the latter declined it alleging there was no contract obligation. The law
of England did not recognize any right in a third party. Chief Justice Shaw ex-
cluded a reference to the law of the place of performance by using Lord Mans-
field's theory in respect to the parties' intent. "There is no reference, tacit or ex-
press, in this instrument, to the laws of England, which can raise a presumption,
that the parties look to them as furnishing the rule of law, which should govern
this contract." The law of Massachusetts was followed.
In Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Company,5 Chief Justice Stone in de-
ciding whether the usury statute of New York or that of Pennsylvania controlled
the transaction in which the parties had engaged, placed the decision on the
ground that the parties had contemplated the law of Pennsylvania. The Circuit
Court of Appeals had reached the same result on two grounds, namely, that the
last act, the delivery of the note, was done in Pennsylvania which thereby became
the place of the making of the contract; and on the further ground that the note
was payable in Philadelphia which thereby became the place of performance.
In Slater v. Mexican tNational Railroad Company,6 the widow and children
of a switchman employed by the defendant, killed in Mexico through the defend-
ant's negligence, sued the defendant, a Colorado corporation, and in an action for
death, in the United States Court for the District of Texas. The plaintiffs relied
upon the Mexican law. Justice Holmes overruled the objection that the action
was not transitory and refused to allow the plaintiffs the benefit of the Texas
remedy, namely, the payment of a lump sum, on the ground that it was broader
4 2 Met. 381, 43 Mass. 381 (1841). The plaintiff claimed the benefit of a contract made by
others-a concept of vast interest in insurance law. W. R. Vance, The Beneficiary's Interest
in a Life Insnrance Policy, 31 YALE L. J. 343 (1922). R. Donald Taylor, Developmens
in Life Imurance, LA REvuE Du BARREAU, Tome 4, No. 6, Montreal, Juin 1944. Deckert v.
Prudential Life Ins. Co. (1943) 0. R. 448, (1943) 3 D. L. R. 747, 10 I. L. R. 158, confirmed
on appeal 10 I. L. R. 211. There was an amendment of the statute which is: (1946) c. 42,
s. 4 adding a new subsection (numbered (2)) to sec. 153 of the Ontario Insurance Act.
There were similar amending acts in the other provinces excepting Quebec. French v. French,
161 Kan. 327, 167 P.2d 305 (1946). Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Rainey, 353 Mo. 477,
182 S.W.2d 624 (1944). Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 125 F.2d 127, (2nd. C.
1942). Feine v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co., 152 Misc. 897, 274 N. Y. S. 344 (1934).
5 274 U. S. 4)3, 47 Sup. Ct. 626, 71 L. Ed. 1123 (1927).
6 194 U. S. 120, 24 Sup. Ct. 581, 48 L. Ed. 900 (1904). Jacobus v. Colgate, 217 N. Y, 235,
111 N. E. 837 (1916). Louchs v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198 (1918).
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than the remedy which the Mexican law allowed, namely, a terminable pension.
"The theory of the foreign suit is that although the act complained of was sub-
ject to no law having force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio,
which, like other obligations, follows the person, and may be enforced wherever
the person may be found." The obligation, however, did not operate mechanically;
it was subject to equitable considerations. Therefore, a broader remedy than that
flowing from the obligation was refused.
When we pass to the cases concerning the constitutional conceptions of due
process and full faith and credit do we find anything different from the plastic
quality of the general cases? Do tht constitutional cases follow a process of adapta-
tion? The insurance cases that involve the due process and full faith and credit
clauses show a plastic quality.
We may trace the changes in the constitutional ideas by the insurance cases
alone and without regard to the matrimonial and employer liability cases that
the non-judicial authorities have discussed more intensely than the insurance cases.
In early cases in the United States Supreme Court the applications provided
that the insurance would not take effect until the first premium had been paid.
Equitable Life Asrurance Society v. Clements7 is an example. These cases gave
momentum to the place of making as a decisive fact. Although Hooper v. Cali-
fornia8 indicated clearly that a state contact with an insurance transaction might
be enough to make the local law applicable-there the use of a broker within
the state by a resident of the state for the purpose of closing a marine insur-
ance contract with an insurer in New York was held enough to subject the
transaction to state control-the latter case of Allgeyer v. Louisiana9 placed
special stress upon the fact that the contract of insurance was made without the
state-a citizen of Louisiana placed marine insurance with a New York insurer
by a letter-and the emphasis thus given was of such a degree that the place of
making seemed to have emerged as a definite standard although the litigation
respecting premium notices, Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Hill1 ° being
an example, indicated that the place of performance and even the law contemplat-
ed by the parties might be important.
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge,1 involving a policy loan upon a Missouri
policy where the court found evidence of making in New York, Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Dunken,12 where the state of Texas was refused the right to apply
a penalty statute to a policy which had been exchanged according to the terms
7 140 U. S. 226, 11 Sup. Ct. 822, 35 L. Ed. 497 (1891). Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York
v. Cohen, 179 U. S. 262, 21 Sup. Ct. 106, 45 L. Ed. 181 (1900).
8 155 U. S. 648, 15 Sup. Ct. 207, 39 L. Ed. 297 (1895).
9 165 U. S. 578, 17 Sup. Ct. 427, 41 L. Ed. 832 (1897).
10 193 U. S. 551, 24 Sup. Ct. 538, 48 L. Ed. 788 (1904).
11 246 U. S. 357, 38 Sup. Ct. 337 ,62 L. Ed. 772 (1918).
12 266 U. S. 389, 45 Sup. Ct. 129, 69 L. Ed. 342 (1924).
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of a policy issued in Tennessee, and Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York r. Liebing,"3
where a policy loan was found to be a Missouri contract either as the acceptance
in Missouri of an offer in the policy or as the acceptance in Missouri by the
Company of a proposal for a loan, each and everyone of these cases, went on the
basis that the place of making was the decisive factor. A tradition was appar-
ently being established in the court that the due process clause might be resolved
in insurance cases by reference to the place of the making of the contract.
Today the place of making plays a large part in the solution of the prob-
lems which arise under the due process clause but the adaptation which is inherent
in the conflicts process has long since given the place of making rule a coordinate
rather than a controlling power. Home Insurance Company v. Dick,14 where
Texas was denied the power to apply its statute of limitations to a fire policy
written in Mexico, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Delta Pine Co.,15
where Mississippi was denied the right to nullify the short statute of limitations
in a fidelity bond written in Tennessee, Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Moore,18 where the State of New York was permitted to treat as abandoned
property the proceeds of policies issued upon the lives of persons resident in
New York where the insured continued to live in New York and the beneficiary
was a resident of New York at the time of maturity; all of these cases are under
the influence of the older tradition of the court that the place of making is im-
portant. In none of these cases, however, does the court rest the decision upon
the place of making alone; and in the opinions we find new and different thoughts
expressed. In the Dick case,1" the opinion states that no question of public policy
is involved since the insurers have not invoked the aid of any Texas processes;
in the Delta Pine Co. case, 5 the opinion refers to the interest which Mississippi
had in the contract as being slight; in the Moore case, 16 the majority and dissenting
opinions discussed the meaning of "contact" with the transaction.
These concepts, differing from that of the place of making, which thus
appear in the cases have an historical background. In Compania General De Tabacos
v. Collector,17 a premium tax was allowed where the insured property was at
some time within the territorial power of the Philippine Islands which laid the
tax; Boseman v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co.18 found that a group policy
was made in Pennsylvania and controlled by that law but it was first necessary
to eliminate the Texas statute of limitations by so construing another Texas statute
as to find that the insurer was not doing business in the state; Osborn v. Ozlin19
found a relationship between the state of Virginia's interest in insurance con-
18 259 U. S. 209, 42 Sup. Ct. 467, 66 L. Ed. 900 (1922).
14 281 U. S. 397, 50 Sup. Ct. 338, 74 LEd. 926 (1930).
15 292 U. S. 143, 54 Sup. Ct. 634, 74 L. Ed. 1178 (1934).
16 333 U. S. 541, 68 Sup. Ct. 682, 92 L. Ed. 641 (1948). 58 Yale . Ji. 628 (1949).
17 275 U. S. 87, 48 Sup. Ct. 100, 72 L. Ed. 177 (1927).
18 301 U. S. 196, 57 Sup. Ct. 686, 81 L. Ed. 1036 (1937).
19 310 U. S. 53, 60 Sup. Ct. 758, 84 L. Ed. 1074 (1940). Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland
v. Tafoya, 270 U. S. 426, 46 Sup. Ct. 331, 70 L. Ed. 664 (1926).
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tracts and its statutory restrictions on the activities of non-resident agents; and
in Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen20 where the power of New York to regulate
reciprocals which wrote their contracts in Illinois was upheld, the place of mak-
ing was described as heresy arising from "conceptualistic discussion," and the
place of performance fared no better. Thus adaptation working its way against
the earlier trends in the court became the means of settlement of the problems
arising under the due process clause.
The cases arising under the full faith and credit clause concern statutes. The
place of making appears here again as a tradition and again disappears. In
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 21 Section 58 of the New York
Insurance Law was given full faith and credit in Georgia after the court had
reached the statute by fixing the place of making in New York. In Order of
United Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe 22 where an Ohio beneficiary
Society had issued a certificate in South Dakota to a citizen of that state the short
statute of limitations in the Society's certificate of incorporation prevailed over
the limitations statute of South Dakota where the contract was made. The place
of making was absorbed in the larger interest of the administration of a common
fund; the Ohio law became controlling.
Renvoi, because it rests on a mechanical reference to a foreign law and a con-
sequent mechanical reference back to the law of the forum, is criticized.
It is ridiculed, Re Duke of Wellington" is an example. The English courts were
asked to construe the will of a British subject domiciled in England that had been
executed for the purpose of conveying lands in Spain. The court referred to the
Spanish law, since the lands were situated in Spain, and found that the Spanish
law followed the law of the domicile of the testator and thereby referred back
to English law. University of Chicago v. Dater2 4 is a further example. A married
woman, resident in Michigan, signed a note in Michigan and sent it to Illinois
where a mortgage was placed on land in Illinois as security. In a suit upon the
note the Michigan court referred to the law of Illinois, the place of contracting,
and the Illinois law referred the matter to the place of the execution of the note
which was Michigan.
The renvoi process rests upon an attempt to set up standards. The standard
which most often emerges is the conflicts rule of another jurisdiction. Erie R. Co.
20 318 U. S. 313, 63 Sup. Ct. 602, 87 L. Ed. 1722 (1943).
21 299 U. S. 178, 57 Sup. Ct. 129, 81 L. Ed. 106 (1936). Morris v. Jones, 32') U. S. 545,
67 Sup. Ct. 451, 91 .. Ed. 488 (1947).
22 331 U. S. 586, 67 Sup. Ct. 1355, 91 L. Ed. 1687 (1947).
28 (1947) Ch. 506, (1948) Ch. 118. J. H. C. Morris, Renvoi, 64 L. Q. REV. 264 (1948). Note,
61 Harv. L. Rev. 1055 (1948). New York Life Ins. Co. v. Waterman 104 F.2d 990
(9th Cir. 1939). Blair v. New York Life Ins. Co., 40 C.A.2d 494, 104 P.2d 1075
(1940). Braun v. New York Life Ins. Co., 46 C.A.2d 335, 115 P.2d 880 (1941). Erwin
N. Griswold, Renvoi Rev;sited, 51 Hmrv. L. REV. 1165 (1938).
24 277 Mich. 658, 27.0 N. W. 175 (1936).
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v. Tompkins25 develops a like situation, and since the process is mechanical it
often nullifies the intent of the parties. In Duskin v. Pennsylvania Central Air
Lines Corporation,2 6 an air pilot's contract of employment contained a clause
that the employer's liability for death by accident would be controlled by the
law of Pennsylvania. The Federal court referred to the Pennsylvania conflicts
rule which followed the law of the place of the tort and the law of Alabama
thus became the law of the case.
The plastic quality of the conflicts process seeks to distinguish the renvoi
principle. Thus the conflicts rule of the foreign jurisdiction is often disregarded.
In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Waterman,2 7 the court avoided the statutory con-
flicts rule of the forum as an arbitrary standard by finding a possibility of per-
formance within the forum. Thereby the issue respecting the validity of an
incontestable clause in respect to reinstatement was controlled by the law of
California where the contract had been partly performed and not referred
to the law of New York by reason of the conflicts rule set out in the California
Civil Code only to have the New York conflicts rule refer the matter back to
California.
To Mr. Cook and to Mr. Lorenzen the conflicts process is a process of adapta-
tion.
Mr. Cook, rejecting the territorial test, moves from standardization to
adaptation. Although he often overlooks the difference between statute and case
law, and at times drifts back to territorial thought, his basic approach is never-
theless, that of adaptation in that it is through the consideration of the data
of each new situation. He notes that all of the acts of the parties hardly ever
take place in one state and suggests that two states may have joint jurisdiction-
a point that recalls two decisions. The first is Justice Stone's opinion in Seeman
v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co.,25 where the court held that the parties had a
:hoice between the usury laws of New York and Pennsylvania. The second case
is Chief Justice Taney's decision in Andrews v. Pond,2 9 where a plea of usury was
raised in respect to a note delivered in New York and payable in Mobile and the
court held that while the law of the place of performance was usually followed,
yet if there is evidence of an intent to evade the law of place of making, that
law would control and the issue must be determined by a jury. In the field of life
insurance the point is illustrated by the regulation of the Missouri Insurance
Department whereby a coupon application that rests upon acceptance in another
state must when taken in Missouri carry an endorsement that the resulting con-
tract is subject to Missouri law.30 Mr. Cook does not allow always for the part
26 Note 1.
26 167 F.2d 727 (6th Cix. 1948). Note 16 U. oF CHi. L. REv. 157 (1948).
27 Note 23.
28 Note 5.
29 13 Peters 65, 10 1. Ed. 61 (1839).
80 Columbian National Life Ins. Co. v. Keyes, 138 F.2d 382 (1st. Cir. 1943). Cert. den. 64
Sup. Ct. 321.
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which statutes may play in this field of the law. (See his discussion of Common-
wealth v. Macloon, 101 Mass. 1.)s 1 A statute may grant a right, as Justice
Holmes pointed out in Mulhall v. Fallon.32 In the field of insurance we have
Brassell v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company3" where the New
York court was asked to assume that New Jersey had a non-forfeiture statute similar
in effect to Section 208 of the New York Insurance Law, and the court declined
to make such an assumption with respect to a statutory enactment. Thus a statute
or the absence of a statute makes a difference. Mr. Cook sometimes overlooks
the part that intent may play (see his discussion of Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass.
374) .4 Intent may bring in by implied reference one aspect of the law of an-
other state: In Milliken v. Pratt3 4 acceptance of the offer of guarantee in Maine
by the shipment of the goods there made a Maine rule a part of the contract. Mr.
Cook saw the conflicts process as one of adaptation; others have sought to stand-
ardize his work into a theory of local law whereby the solution of every problem
depends upon finding a "conflicts" rule.
Mr. Lorenzen attacks the place of contracting theory; he notes that in prac-
tice not a single state consistently follows the rule. He describes "public policy"
as merely a negative factor arising from the illusion of the necessity of fixed
standards. He points out that while each state may determine its own rule, every
state is interested in the proper administration of justice, and he poses the question,
"What are the demands of justice in the particular situation?" While noting
that the security of local transactions may lead to the use of the place of making
as a criterion, he finds that in the case law the courts seek nevertheless to
render just decisions and they consider the social interests. In the technical aspects
of his work Mr. Lorenzen vested in the court of the forum, with some few ex-
ceptions, not only the power to define the facts as either contract or tort, but also
the qualification of the connecting factor such as the place of making, and
the characterization of substantive and procedural law. There is thus created
in the court of the forum a process that is plastic rather than standardized.35
The thought of Mr. Cook and Mr. Lorenzen leads us to the decision in
International Shoe Co. v. The State of Washington.36 The state had enacted a
statute requiring that payments be made into an unemployment compensation
fund. It imposed such a tax and sued the petitioner for collection. The petitioner
relied upon the due process clause, alleging that it was not within the state either
for the purpose of taxation or suit. The court rejected all mechanical applications
of either "presence" or territorial power. The place of the decision in the conflicts
field becomes apparent when the decision is reduced to its lowest terms, namely,
31 The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L. J. 457 (1924).
32 176 Mass. 374, 57 N. E. 386 (1900).
88 134 Misc. 274, 255 N. Y. S. 195 (1929).
34 Note 31.
35 Hartman v. Time Inc. 166 F.2d 127 (3rd Cir. 1948). Cert. den. 68 Sup. Ct. 1495.
Note, 48 Col. L. Rev. 932 (1948). Anderson v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 222
Minn. 428, 24 N.W.2d 836 (1946).
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that the petitioner was drawing funds out of Washington from which a state
statute required a deduction for the purpose of bearing some part of the social
cost. There was a clear relation between the activities of the petitioner in the
state and the social cost, and the petitioner was obliged to contribute to the cost.
The requirements of the fair and orderly administration of the law prevailed
over mechanical standards. The decision is an application of Mr. Cook's idea of
joint legislative jurisdiction in a case where a corporation is involved and follows
Mr. Lorenzen's test: "What are the demands of justice in the particular situation?"
The balancing of the various contacts in a transaction for the purpose of
finding a dominant factor and thereby determining the controlling law assumes
that there is one controlling law; and the process of balancing the factors creates
an illusion of a mechanical standard that may be reached by weighing. We have
found already that the idea of a single controlling law is often illusory. While
contact is a value in determining relationship, even a dominant contact is not
necessarily the decisive factor. Justice Jackson in Connecticut Mutual Life In-
surance Company v. Moore37 wrote that the term "contact," "seems taken over
from some vernacular other than that of the law." I see the difficulty in a different
way. The word "contact," whatever its origin may be, requires qualification. In
the life insurance field there are two cases which refer to the process. They are
Jones v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,38 where the issue was whether the law
of New York or New Jersey was controlling in respect to a misrepresentation;
and United Service Life Insurance Co. v. Farr,3 9 where the issue was whether the
law of the District of Columbia or of Alabama was controlling on a change of
beneficiary when a soldier's letter was not delivered to the insurer. In neither
case does the court finally rely upon a balancing of the factors as a method of de-
termination. In the field of insurance the method appears awkward and never
performs the promise which it holds out. When we consider this method of de-
termination there comes to mind the use which the English courts have made
of intention, and in Compania Transatlanctica Centro-Americana v. Alliance As-
surance Co. Ltd.,40 where the court refers to a balancing of the factors, the court
imperceptibly moves over into the field of intention. Intention allows a freer
play to the judicial process. The United States Supreme court emphasized intent
as early as Liverpool and Great Western Steam Co. v. Pfienix Insurance Co.,41
and while the English courts reached a different result using the same test of
intent in In re Missouri Steamship Co.,42 both of the cases involving clauses ex-
cluding negligence in marine risks, nevertheless the respective courts were able
36 326 U. S. 310, 66 Sup. Ct. 154, L. Ed. 95 (1945). Cf. Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse
Co., note 5.
87 Note 16.
39 158 Misc. 466, 286 N, Y. S. 4 (1936).
89 60 F. Supp. 829 (S. D. N. Y. 1945).
40 50 F. Supp. 986 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
41 129 U. S. 397, 9 Sup. Ct. 469, 32 L. Ed. 788 (1889).
42 42 Ch. D. 321 (1889).
CONFLICT THEORIES AND LIFE INSURANCE SETTLEMENTS
in each cast to make convincing distinctions on the basis of the language that the
parties had used in the shipping documents. The process of balancing the factors-
a development of using contact as a means of decision-offers a formula that
never leads to a result. In the effort to s'ecure a result the court is likely to shift
to the test of intent.
Professor Beale took a stand. He singled out the place of making as the test
entitled to preference. He selected the place of making as the controlling law
because it promoted the ease and certainty of counsel in stating the controlling
law to the interested parties. The need of adaptation prevented Professor Beale's
theory from ever taking root; and in later work Professor Beale found a change
in the general conflicts field which he described as a trend toward "sociological
jurisprudence."
In choosing the place of making because of its relation to individual con-
veniences Professor Beale went on the footing that the true function of the law
is to make possible correct prediction of future events-a power to prophesy.
The parties could always know the law if they consulted counsel at the place
of the making of the contract. All the other methods of approach dulled the power
to prophesy-it was already clear from the cases that the intention test would vary
with the court; the place of performance if it were accepted as the test would re-
quire a prediction by counsel remote from the parties.
The developments ia insurance law show that in seeking certainty as a goal
Professor Beale had in mind an ideal that the courts were prepared to accept
as an essential. The law of the place of making has indeed given a degree of
certainty in some aspect of the insurance law and a power to prophesy. When
we examine this development in the insurance law, however, we find that the
decisive factor was not a preference for the place of making concept but a social
determination. The result flows not from an interest in a power to prohesy
but from a power of sovereignty. It rests on group interest and never upon per-
sonal convenience. Constitutional rules have made some differences. In Jones
v. Prudential Insurance Company,4 4 a South Carolina statute making all con-
tracts with foreign corporations South Carolina contracts was interpreted to
refer to citizens of South Carolina at the time of making, and the court held that
the statute was not controlling on an insurance contract made in Massachusetts
by a resident of that state who later moved to South Carolina.
Prophecy could not eliminate from the law the essential function of reconcil-
ing conflicting interests. Modern communciation made the place of making itself
often uncertain; the place of making became a matter for determination, Problems
arise after the making which are not apparent before the making, and a con-
flict of sovereignties may be involved as well as a conflict of personal interests.
48 Joseph H. Beale, Social Justice and Business Costs, 49 HAav. L. REv. 593 (1936).
44 210 S. C. 264, 42 S.E.2d 331 (1947).
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Thus the necessity for adaptation in th- conflicts process excludes any standardized
approach.
In his later work Professor Beale described the more plastic process which
became apparent in the general field as "sociological jurisprudence." The older
cases that we have reviewed had already indicated even in the field of contract
that there was a power of adaptation in the law whereby it could adapt itself
to varying conditions. It is this inherent process which is important and not the
results; therefore, the word "sociological" may have referred to a result rather
than a means. Professor Beale's theory of the place of making centered attention
on the usefulness of certainty, but the process itself, following its basic objectives
of adaptation and reconciliation, rejects any standard.
Standardization, we find upon summary, has never been able to make a lasting
impression in the conflict of laws process. Mansfield, Shaw, Holmes and Stone,
the masters of the common law, emphasized the multiplicity of the possible theories
of decision which were present in the conflicts field. In the field of insurance
law the United States Supreme Court at an early date relied upon the place of
making concept for the solution of the problems under the dut process and full
faith and credit clauses of the Constitution; but that court in the lapse of time
came to reject "conceptualistic" theories both of the place of making and of the
place of performance. Mr. Cook followed Justice Holmes in rejecting the idea
that legislative power is territorial and proposed to examine the data of each new
situation. Mr. Lorenzen, after giving a more plastic quality to the process by
requiring definition through characterization and qualification, came to the test
of the proper administration of justice. Chief Justice Stone, in International Shoe
Company v. Washington,45 made an application of this theory to commercial
facts. Professor Beale, who accepted early the place of making since it was most
consistent with the convenience of the parties, recognized at the end what he
described as a "sociological jurisprudence." There is only one point at which the
mechanical standard has been present, and the resulting standardization has come not
through the conflicts process but from an entirely different source. The rule in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkinsr6 compels the federal courts to follow the state law; a
continuous search for state law is thereby set in motion. The federal courts have
thus come, in the solution of problems in the conflicts field, to search for a state
conflicts rule; and they have thereby brought into the conflicts field some of
the elements of renvoi. The conflicts process in and by itself had been able to re-
ject the renvoi theory. The process that controls the conflict of laws is a plastic
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At the beginning of the opinion in Carnegie v. Morriron,47 Chief Justice
Shaw noted the importance of the case in the world of commerce; the case "in-
volves questions of much difficulty and of great importance to the mercantile com-
munity."
The cases that we meet in the conflicts field are concerned mostly with com-
mercial transactions. Commerce among the states gives rise to the problems in
the conflicts field. Eencficial commerce requires a certain capacity of adaptation-
if adaptation is not the very means by which commerce operates. Commerce
is never mechanical; it never becomes standardized; it expands; it develops. Com-
merce is a continuous act of adaptation. The subject matter over which the con-
flict process works is malleable and plastic.
Comercial expansion compelled readjustment in both the Roman and Eng-
lish legal systems. Commercial expansion in the Mediterranean world led Roman
praetors to accept the jus gentium that signified the rules accepted as binding
by all peoples. Sir Henry Maine tells us that the jus gentium was originally in part
a market law and grew out of commercial exigencies and that the Roman
praetors assumed jurisdiction in disputes to which th-e parties were either foreigners,
or a native and a foreigner, half by way of exercise of a police power, and half in
the furtherance of commerce. Sir Frederick Pollock states that because the growing
power of Rome had brought merchants and traders from all parts of the Medi-
terranean, the needs of business demanded some practical solution, and therefore,
the jus gentium was accepted. In English commercial development the custom of
merchants, which Sir Frederick Pollock has defined as thL actual usage of the
European commercial world, was first treated as matter of fact that might be sub-
mitted to a jury for determination and later, in the eighteenth century, was
treated as established law of which the English judges had knowledge and which
could no longer be treated as an issue of fact. A high degree of adaptation was
required to accomplish these purposes; Blackstone and Mansfield were contempor-
aries.' 8
The law wins its place as a social force by an inherent power to create order
in commercial affairs;, and the power which it exercises there is t or
force nor the duress of arbitrary command. When Sir Fred,",;rk Pollock p-.'--
of the genius of the law, he refers to a capacity for creating order which in
the artistic world is called composition, a process by which several different
elements are drawn together so as to make a whole and to the mutual advantage
of all the elements, while prieserving the individual freedom of each of the parts.
The conflicts of law process is one of the means by which the genius of the law
works. So great a power as this in the performance of so important a function
is necessarily imaginative in character.
47 Note 4.
48 Sir Henry Maine, ANCIENT LAw, John Murray, London, (1906).
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Having searched the conflicts field in its broader scope and having found
that the standardized and the mechanical have made no impression there, we
come now to the narrower field of insurance law, where the material is less
voluminous and we may trace the development of conflict theories in decided
cases. In the insurance field we shall refer first to the theoretical thought which
has developed, and then we shall mark the smaller insurance field off from the
larger field by noting conditions which are peculiar to the insurance field. We
shall then determine if the plastic quality of adaptation is present in the insur-
ance field by a reference to the cases that have risen in the various fields of in-
surance practice. We shall close by an analysis of eleven cases concerned with
insurance settlements.
The theoretical approach to the conflicts problems in the insurance field
has all of that discontent which disturbs those who are forever seeking standards.
Professor Griswold makes the following statement in his work on spendthrift
trusts:49
"In a review of the first edition of this book, the foregoing language
was quoted with the following comment: 'Does Mr. Griswold join me in
throwing up his hands?' 23 It may be observed that American conflict
of laws in the contracts field is in such utter confusion, both in doctrine
and in decision, that it affords virtually no guide to student, practitioner,
or judge. Mr. Beale set up a system which had considerable merit in terms
of workability. He tried to show that it was logically necessary as well,
and on this ground met serious attack. Those who conducted that attack
with such vigor may well consider the result of their handiwork."
The suggestion which Professor Griswold offers is federal legislation similar
to that which fixes the liability of carriers and telegraph companies and which
controls radio communication.
Guy B. Horton writing in the Cornell Law Quarterly on: "What law governs
the disposition of insurance proceeds?" refers to "The Maze and Suggested Ways
Ourt.115o
The solution which Mr. Horton suggests is a greater emphasis upon the
domicile of the beneficiary.
A note in a recent volume of the Harvard Law Review discussing the validity
of spendthrift restrictions in life insurance settlements finds that the inevitable
problem in the conflict of laws arises in an acute form when the optional settle-
ment is with a company incorporated in one state, the insured domiciled
in another, the beneficiary living in a third, and finally suit brought in a fourth
state, all with different substantive laws; and after reviewing the cases the note
reaches the conclusion that the court of the forum should follow the law of the
49 Erwin N. Griswold, SPENDTHUIFT TRusTs, 2d. Ed., § 113 The Conflict of Laws. New York
(1947).
50 25 CoRN. L. Q. 169 (1940).
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domicile of the insured or the beneficiary, thereby following "significant claims"
rather than "factual connections." The note defines "significant claims" as "se-
curing protection for those who may become public charges or create social malad-
justment in the homes of relatives ..."51
Each of these discussions has a common factor; each seeks standards. The
suggested standards will not serve; they will not stand up under analysis. They
are already inconsistent with experience.
We cannot go back to Professor Beale's theory of the place of making now.
A solution through federal legislation is not only too large a task, it is too
removed. The experience with the Hartner Act and the Carmack Act Amendment
and the Communications Act is too narrow to serve as a precedent for the com-
plex statutory structures on which insurance now rests. The proposal is revolution-
ary in the sense that it invites too vast a change.
The use of the law of the domicile of the beneficiary will not save the
beneficiary from becoming a public charge. The recent case of Tate v. Hain2
is sufficient to show that. There the Virginia Court was required to go to the
law of New York, a state where neither the insured nor the beneficiary resided,
in order to preserve and carry out the settlement.
The contact resulting from the residence of the beneficiary or assignee
has never reached that dominance in the insurance conflict field which the
courts had once given to the place of making. In Washington National Insur-
ance Company v. Shau,,53 where an Illinois insurer doing business in Texas
resisted payment upon a policy which it had issued in California because of a
misrepresentation in the application respecting the insured's health, the court
rejected the suggestion that the issue should be controlled by the law of Texas
where the beneficiary and assignee resided. Intention was dominant in the court's
mind-"the contract was not in fact made or entered into with reference to
the laws of Texas;"--"the insured was given the right to have the beneficiary
changed at any time upon request, irrespective of the place of residence of such
beneficiary."
We have found already many references to social ends. Mr. Cook and Mr.
Lorenzen emphasized the point. Professor Beale referred in his later work to
"sociological jurisprudence." The Harvard Law Review note reemphasized social
ends in defining significant claims-"those whom the insured considered it wise
to restrain should not through their ignorance or profligacy be permitted to be
public charges."
If we place to one side the definition of social ends which are desirable
we find it necessary to fix the processes of the law with which we are here con-
51 Validity of Spendthrift Restrictions in Life Insurance Settlements: Choice of Law. 61 HARV,
L. REv. 687 (1948).
52 181 Va. 402, 25 S.E.2d 321 (1943).
53 180 S.W.2d 1003 (1944).
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cered; if we look at the case of Black v. New York Life Insurance Co.,6"
decided nearly half a century ago, where the court held that the insured's
widow might assign her rights in the settlement arrangement and the assignee
could collect the forty semi-annual installments of $250, and where the word
"trust" first entered the discussion, and if we look at the later development
of Section 15 in the N-w York Personal Property Law, which created a power in
the insured to prevent such an assignment, something more appears necessary
than social ends in order to give settlement agreements validity. Social ends
then appear as results rather than means. The law must retain a certain plastic
quality and power of adaptation whereby it can serve ends which may be desirable.
The life quality rests in this capacity. If we standardize we deprive the law of
the inherent capacity by which it may attain desirable results.
In the field of conflict of laws the insurance problems are a part of a
larger group; they are a class with its own peculiarities. There we are dealing
with species rather than genus.
Insurance is a process that crosses and recrosses state lines continual-
ly. Interstate action is not peculiar to insurance; many forms of business
and industrial activity are of interstate nature. The peculiarity of the insurance
process rests in interstate action and something more. While insurance is inter-
state in action it is local in character; the combined interstate and local nature
is the distinguishing mark.
We must examine therefore the local character of insurance further. In-
surance rests on statutory law that originates in the states. The states give effect
to local statutory systems by a process that, while falling short of local incorporation,
gives much the same result. The local law gives the interstate activity an ever
varying local character. For example-the effect of suicide may depend on a
state statute; in Missouri there is a direct statutory provision; 65 in New York
the statute fixing the standard provisions plays a part.5 6
The presence of statutes affects the conflicts rule. Statutes directed to internal
law may be decisive. A Missouri statute that controls the issuance of extended
insurance may become a part of the contract.5 7 A policy payable to a citizen of
Texas, issued by a company doing business in Texas, is a Texas contract regard-
less of a provision in the contract to the contrary.58 The statutory systems are
supplemented by presumptions. The law in Pennsylvania presumes that a policy
was delivered at the insured's residence.5 9 In the absence of proof respecting
64 126 N. Y. S. 334, (1910). The legislature amended § 15 so as to let in insurance arrange-
ments at the next session. Ch. 327, L. 1911.
55 Mo. R. S. Ann., 1939, § 5851.
56 Franklin v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 298 N. Y. 81, 80 N.E.2d 746 (1948).
57 Smith v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 232 Mo. A. 935, 107 S.W. 2d 191 (1937).
5S Vernon's Civil Stats. Art. 5054 (4950). See Onstad v. State Mutual Life Assur. Co. 226 Minn.
60, 32 N.W.2d 185 (1948) for the application of a similar rule in Minnesota.
59 Pierkowskie v. New York Life Ins. Co., 147 F.2d 928 (3rd. Cir. 1945). Faron v.
Penn. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 176 F.2d 290 (3rd Cir. 1949).
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the law of a foreign jurisdiction, a presumption may arise that it is no more
favorable than the local law.60 Where a statute is lacking, the courts may create
a statute by a process of analogy. The New Jersey courts were able in that way
to sustain a spendthrift trust provision in an option settlement; the court there
referred to an existing statute limiting the rights of creditors in respect to the
income from trusts.61 A statute validating the spendthrift trust restrictions that
an insured places in an option settlement may be extended by construction so as
to include an option settlement that a beneficary elects after the insured's death.62
There is a prevalence of statutes in the insurance field; there is a tendency to fall
back on statutes. Statutes in the insurance field have a plastic influence on the law.
There is not present there a tendency found in other fields of the law, where
progress by statute is restrained by a continuous reference to the preceding case
law and which Roscoe Pound illustrates by noting the difference between the
civilian lawyer and the common lawyer in the interpretation of a code, namely,
that a civilian lawyer starts with the statute and the common lawyer starts with
the interpretations that the courts gave to the statute prior to the change.
Mr. Lorenzen referred to the concept of public policy as a negative product
of the urge to fix standards. Public policy is not only present in the insurance
conflicts field but it is often potent there. In Lieberthal v. Glens Falls Indemnity
Company,63 the Supreme Court of Michigan in determining an action for per-
sonal injuries sustained in an automobile accident in Wisconsin held that the
action must be dismissed in view of a Michigan statute forbidding the Michigan
courts to entertain actions that made the insurer a party defendant. A dissenting
opinion rested on the point that the Wisconsin law, Wisconsin being the state
where the policy was delivered and where the accident happened, could create
a substantive right in the plaintiff; it distinguished the public policy standard
by pointing out that the Michigan law treated the act of joining the insurer as
malum prohibitum rather than malum in se.
The expression "public policy" has emotive power. The words are emotional.
The federal courts have used the expression in such a manner as to combine the
emotional nature of the words and the negative nature of the concept. Rublin v. New
York Life Ins. Co."' put the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins " in force in
the insurance field. Griffen v. McCoach66 brought to insurance transactions the
rule laid down in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 67 namely, that the federal courts
60 Pink v. A. A. A. Highway Express, 191 Ga. 520, 13 S.E.2d 337, aff. 314 U. S. 201 (1941).
61 Chelsea-Wheeler Coal Co. v. Marvin, 134 N. J. E. 432, 35 A.2d 874 (1944).
62 Provident Trust Co. v. Rothman, 321 Pa. 177, 183 A. 793 (1936).
68 316 Mich. 37, 24 N.W.2d 547 (1946). See Anderson v. State Farm Mut. Automobile
Ins. Co., note 35. But see Ritterbush v. Sexmith, 41 N.W.2d 611, (Sup. Ct. Wis. 1950)




66 313 U. S. 498, 61 Sup. Ct. 1023, 85 L. Ed. 1481 (1941).
67 313 U. S. 487, 61 Sup. Ct. 1020, 85 L. Ed. 1477 (1941).
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are obliged to ascertain the state conflicts rule; and in making this application
of the law the Court referred to the public policy of Texas and stated that in
conflicts issues the federal courts could not enforce a cause of action that was
contrary to the public policy of the state. Public policy was there used as a
generalized reference to a peculiar rule of the Texas law that requires that an
assignee have an insurable interest. The policy was delivered in New York;
the beneficial interest arose from a form executed in Texas that the insured sent
to the assignees in New York and that the assignees sent to the insurer in New
Jersey. The Court made no application of either the conflicts or insurance rules
to the facts but brought in the Texas law by finding that the federal courts
must respect the public policy of Texas-". . . a state is not required to enforce
a law obnoxious to its public policy." This reference to public policy has exerted
an influence in the conflicts field. In Tuthill v. Fidelity & Deposit Company
of Maryland,68 and in United Commercial Travelers v. Meinsen," the insurer
pleaded a short statute of limitations in the insurance contract. The defence there-
by put in issue sec. 3351 of the Missouri statutes that bars contractual limitation
of the time in which suits may be brought. In the Tuthill case the St. Louis Court
of Appeals decided for the insurer on the ground that the contract had been
made in Illinois where the provision was valid. In the Meinsen case the United
States District Court, sitting in Missouri, found that the benefit certificate was
an Ohio contract and held nevertheless that the court could not enforce the
contract limitation in view of the public policy of Missouri as expressed in the
statute. The court noted that the plaintiff was a resident of Ohio suing in the
Missouri courts. In the Tuthill case the plaintiff was a resident of Illinois operat-
ing a filling station in Missouri. Later in Asel v. Order Of United Commercial
Travelers,70 the Supreme Court of Missouri found that a benefit certificate was
an Ohio contract and that the limitation was valid under the law of Ohio; but
the court refused to 'enforce the limitation on the ground that it was in conflict
with the public policy of Missouri. The plaintiff was a resident of Missouri;
in defining public policy the cout wrote: "The protection of our citizens is one
of the objectives." Thus the definition of public policy, which Mr. Lorenzen des-
cribed as a negative standard, is capable of infinite variation and thereby public
policy not only loses the quality of a standard but the concept becomes a mere
revival of the comity theory in a negative form. It is a rule of law however; and
it must be taken into the account.
The insurance forms create a peculiarity. The influence of the forms, al-
though they were drawn without reference to the conflict rules, has been im-
portant. The doctrines of warranty and representation are essential safeguards
in the insuring process; they create conditions in the contract based upon time.
68 119 S.W.2d 468 (1938).
69 131 F.2d 176 (8th. Cir. 1942).
70 193 S.W.2d 74 (1946), aff. 197 S.W.2d 639 (1946).
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The physical condition of the applicant at the time of delivery is a material
fact. Gradually there developed in the applications provisions that the policy
did not become binding unless the policy had been delivered to the insured
while in good health and unless the insured had paid the first premium. The
courts often gave these final steps in the insuring process the character of "last
acts" in the concept of the law that looked to the place of the making of the con-
tract. The Supreme Court of the United States in earlier cases followed this
analysis and I have cited some of these cases in discussing the full faith and
credit and due process clauses. The development of the rule in the states is
illustrated by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Haack,71 Laventhal v.
New York Life Insurance Company,72 and Levy v. Mutual Life Insurance Com-
pany.
73
The coupon application was a variation of the forms and led to a different
result; it contemplated an act by the insurer in accepting the application. This
form shifted the place of making to the state where the insurer had its home office
since generally the underwriting act was completed there. The law of the state
where the insurer was incorporated then became controlling. Fields v. Equitable
Life Assurance Society,74 is an example among the cases. The insurance depart-
ments of some states have sought by regulation to create a two state contact when
the coupon application is used. The law of the place of the residence of the
insured is thereby made controlling. In Columbian National Life Insurance Com-
pany v. Keyes,75 the court followed the Missouri suicide statute in determining
the liability of the insurer for a death by suicide where the policy had been issued
upon an application the insured signed in Missouri and the insurer accepted
in Massachusetts, the application containing a notation that the policy, if issued,
would be a Missouri contract and construed under the laws of that state.
Since intent is an important factor in contract relations it is quite natural
that the courts not only treat those steps as final acts which the application
characterizes as tht essential steps in the insuring process, but also look there
for the declaration of the intent in respect to the controlling law. The forms
did not thereby become standards of action. Flexibility was present. Thus the
coupon application created a different result since it indicated a different in-
tention. When the states through their regulatory bodies took a fuller control
of insurance they sought to create a two state contact by an endorsement on the
application.
The earlier forms had given insurance a local character that its interstate
character has never been able to remove. Mr. Justice Black, while applying
71 50 F. Supp. 55 (W. D. La. 1943).
72 40 F. Supp. 157 (E. D. Mo. 1941).
78 56 N.Y.S.2d 32 (1945). The last act rule has determined the applicable law in insur-
ance trust. Jackson v. Tallmadge, 246 N. Y. 133, 158 N. E. 48 (1927).
74 118 S.W.2d 521 (1938).
76 Note 30.
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the commerce clause to the insurance field, in United States v. Southeastern Under-
writers noted that insurance is ". . intimately related to local welfare..."7e
The rule requiring the states to give full faith and credit to the statutes
and decisions of the state authorizing a fraternal benefit society appears at
first glance to create a special rule in respect to fraternal benefit societies, quite
apart from the usual conflict rules in the insurance field; but upon analysis
the conflict rules respecting beneficial societies become an application of the
tradition that insurance is local in character. The rationale of the conflict rules
respecting beneficial societies is that the state that authorizes and controls a cor-
poration issuing insurance of this type must be left free to manage the internal
affairs of the society. Justice Holmes stated the rule in Modern Woodmen of
America v. Mixer," and it has been consistently followed but not always under-
stood. The "indivisible unity," the "complex and abiding relation" and "the
common fund" are factual relations that warrant the application of a single law.
The application of the law is in the reference to the state of incorporation. Asel
v. Order of United Commercial Travelers,78 that I have mentioned above in dis-
cussing public policy, must be considered overruled in so far as it held that the
public policy of Missouri barred the Order from using a six months limitation
period in the certificate of insurance. In Order of United Commercial Travelers
v. Wofle,79 the Order had issued in Ohio and delivered in South Dakota to a
resident of South Dakota a certificate of insurance covering death by external,
violent and accidental means. The insured died after the administration of a
local anaesthetic and the beneficiary, a resident of South Dakota, assigned her
interest to a resident of Ohio who sued the Order in the South Dakota courts.
The Order, relying upon the six months limitation provision in the certificate,
proved that the provision was a part of the constitution that the sociey had
adopted under an Ohio statute, and showed that the Ohio courts had held the
restriction valid. A South Dakota statute made all limitations of suit by way
of contract void; the South Dakota courts applied that statute and gave judgment
for the claimant. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed. The majority
opinion rested upon the point that the members of the Order had vested the,
control of the Order's affairs in a representative government created by the laws of
Ohio. The dissenting opinion rested upon the point that South Dakota was exer-
76 322 U. S. 533, 548, 64 Sup. Ct. 1162, 88 L. Ed. 1440 (1944).
'77 267 U. S. 544, 45 Sup. Ct. 389, 69 L. Ed. 783 (1925). Smith v. Commercial Travelers Mut.
Ace. Ass'n. 158 F.2d 65 (7th. Cir. 1946). Cnaada Southern R. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U. S.
527, 3 Sup. Ct. 363, 27 L. Ed. 1020 (1883). Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanumn v.
Green, 237 U. S. 531, 35 Sup. Ct. 724, 59 L. Ed. 1089 (1915). Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. lbs.
237 U. S. 662, 35 Sup. Ct. 692, 59 L. Ed. 1165 (1915). Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Barber,
245 U. S. 146, 38 Sup. Ct. 54, 62 L. Ed. 208 (1917). Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629, 55
Sup. Ct. 589, 79 L. Ed. 1100 (1935). Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W. v. Bolin, 305 U. S. 66,
59 Sup. Ct. 35, 83 L Ed. 45 (1938).
78 Note 70.
79 331 U. S. 586, 67 Sup. Ct. 1355, 91 L. Ed. 1687 (1947). 57 Ya.E L. J. 139 (1947). 15
U. oF CHi. L. REv. 409 (1948).
CONFLICT THEORIES AND LIFE INSURANCE SETTLEMENTS
cising a sovereign power over a matter of local law. Each of the opinions ap-
proached the problem in terms of local law. The majority conceded that South
Dakota might have compelled the Order to conform to the South Dakota statute
under pain of exclusion from the state; the minority feared that the full faith
and credit clause as applied by the majority might give complete power over
the activities of a insurer to a single state. The majority believed that the limita-
tion provision in the certificate was an essential part of the benefit provision
since the plaintiff's claim rested upon Item 4 and the defence upon Item 11 of
the same article IV of the constitution of the Order. The point concerned the
internal affairs of the society. The case was thus decided upon the tradition of
local law which has played such a large part in the insurance field.
Justice Holmes pointed out that the act of applying the law is an act beyond
the characterization of the activities as pertaining to a common fund. The point
respecting the common fund is factual. For example, in U. S. v. Southeastern Under-
writers Mr. Justice Black was able to apply the Federal commerce power on
the ground that individual policyholders living in different states ". . . have
their separate interests blended in one assembled fund of assets upon which all
are equally dependent for payment of their policies.' 80 In New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Cravens,8' the power of the State of Missouri to regulate the computation
of extended insurance prevailed over the insurer's contention that the exercise
of such a power by a state conflicted with the insurer's power as administrator
of a fund collected from policyholders that lived in different states. The common
iund theory, when established, goes no further than to suggest the necessity of
a single controlling law. It does not indicate the controlling law. In Order of
United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe,"2 the court made a choice between two
conflicting theories of local law by giving the preference to that which related
to the orderly administration and the solvency of the society. The law of the
state that incorporated the society became the law of the case.
After summarizing the peculiarities which distinguish insurance from the
general conflicts field we may ask if these peculiarities tend toward standard-
ization or create a capacity for adaptation. We have found that the insurance process
crosses and recrosses state lines; that the process is subject to statutes that extend
into codes; that the statutory systems are not static since the courts give amend-
ments the force of new law; that the federal courts in pursuing the theory of
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 3 search for state public policy; that the insurance
forms adopted in respect to the internal law concerning warranties and representa-
tions have given insurance a local character; that the tradition of local control
created the conflicts rule in respect to beneficiary societies. Have these peculiarities
80 Note 76, p. 541.




led to standardization or left the vital capacity for adaptation free? The answer
is that the capacity for adapatation in the insurance field is equal if not greater
than that in the general field. The local character given to insurance has never
been able to dominate the conflicts pattern; it has never been able to give primacy
to the place of making concept. Twenty years ago the New York Court of Ap-
peals stated the diverse factors that give the courts a broad freedom in the
insurance conflicts field. Sliosberg v. New York Life Ins. Co.,84 raised an issue
of constitutional law which required an analysis of the possible sanctions that
the State of New York gives in respect to a contract of insurance. The insurer
had issued and delivered a policy of insurance in Russia payable in rubles. The
Revolution had declared all private insurance illegal. The insured, a Russian
citizen, resident in Paris, sued in New York for the cash surrender value of the
policy. The insurer applied for a stay under a statute enacted in 1926 author-
izing a court to stay any action based on an insurance policy issued prior to the
Russian Revolution by an insurer organized under the laws of a state of the
United States and payable in rubles. The stay, if issued, continued until thirty
days after the future recognition of a government in Russia by the Government
of the United States. The insured urged that the statute impaired the obligation
of the contract. The court, approaching the problem on the concept that a contract
arises by force of law and not by the will of the parties--Chief Justice Shaw
had made the point in Carnegie v. Morrison,85 -noted that the insurer's authority
to make the contract flowed entirely from New York law since New York had
incorporated the insurer; that there was some evidence of an act of acceptance
in New York; finally that the suit was laid against the insurer as debtor in New
York where the insurer was domiciled. The court held that the statute would be
invalid if it were applied as the insurer desired.
The power of the state of incorporation that we found emphasized in the
Wolfe case,86 appears in the Sliosberg case. 87 The presence of the point in the
Sliosberg case, 88 illustrates the scope of the adaptation in the insurance conflicts
field.
The plate that adaptation has in the insurance conflicts field becomes trans-
-parent in reviewing a group of cases having a common subject matter. The com-
mon nucleus brings out by contrast the variations in the use of the conflicts con-
cepts.
Creditors
Here conflict concepts give way to two judicial impluses.
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The first impulse is the tendency to protect local creditors. The court then
reaches its objective by asserting the supremacy of the sovereign power of a state
over a corporate entity.
The second impulse is to follow the insured's intention in conflicts of
interest among local creditors. The court there searches for an indication of the
intention in either statute or an agreement; and the court will use the concept
of contract in order to execute the intention when discovered, whereby a con-
tract between the insurer and the insured arises and with it the sanction that
contracts may not be impaired. The concept of contract has been a decisive help
to beneficiaries when creditors have challenged settlement agreements.
Respecting the first impulse- The insurer's qualification in a state as a foreign
corporation will draw the insurance proceeds into that state for the purpose
of applying them to a debt if the sole equity is that of a local creditor. Thus in
Pierce v. Pierce,89 the Oregon courts permitted a resident creditor to attach
monies due on an account book and on annuity policies belonging to a debtor
residing in Nebraska although the moneys were payable in New York City. That
the debtor could have sued the insurer in Oregon was the decisive point-an
echo of Sliosberg v. New York Life Insurance Company,9 -the emphasis being
placed upon acquired domicile. The tradition is similar to that of ancillary ad-
ministration-the power to apply property to the satisfaction of local creditors.
The power which the states thus exercise has the benefit of the full faith
and credit clause; in Morris v. Jones,9 1 the liquidator of an Illinois insurer that
had qualified in Missouri was directed to give full faith and credit to the amount
and nature of a claim as determined by a Missouri court in proceedings con-
current with the liquidation.
Respecting the second impluse: A provision in the insurance arrange-
ment indicating an intention to prefer the beneficiary will draw in the law of
the place of performance in order that the insured's intention may be carried
out. In Annis v. Pilkewitz,92 the Michigan Supreme Court sustained the right
of a local beneficiary against the claim of a local creditor of the beneficiary, the
court accepting the provision in the settlement agreement that payments be
made in New York City subject to Section 15 of the New York Personal Prop-
erty Law which bars transfers or commutation and, therefore, executions. In
Tate v. Haine,98 the Virginia Supreme Court preferred a local beneficiary over
a Virginia creditor of the beneficiary where the insurance arrangement forbade
an assignment and such an arrangement was valid under the law of New York
where the payments were being made. In Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Miller,9 4
89 153 Or. 248, 56 P.2d 336 (1936).
90 Note 84.
91 329 U. S. 545, 67 Sup. Ct. 451, 91 L. Ed. 488 (1947).
92 287 Mich. 68, 282 N. W. 905 (1938).
9s Note. 52.
94 N. Y. L. J., 6-27-41, p. 2875, aff. 262 A. D. 1016, 288 N. Y. 534, 41 N.E.2d 935 (1942).
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the New York courts preferred a Connecticut beneficiary over a Connecticut
judgment creditor which was a New York corporation where the insurance ar-
rangement used the language of Section 15 of the New York Personal Property
Law and the insured and the insurer were both domiciled in Connecticut.
The courts will not refer to the law of the insurer's domicile if the law of
the forum prefers the beneficiary as. a local creditor of the insurer over other
local creditors. The domicile of the insurer counts if the law there supports
the beneficiary's claim and if there is an indication of a preference either by
agreement or statute; see Chelsea-Wheeler Coal Co. v. Marvin,95 Pool v. New Eng-
land Mutual Life Insurance Company.96 In Mullen v. Trolinger97 the court applied
the law of Missouri where the insurer was domiciled in order to support a spend-
thrift restriction against the attack of an Idaho judgment creditor. In Barry v.
Equitable Life Assurance Society , 9 the New York courts upheld a wife's claim
to the proceeds because of the insurer's domicile in New York where the con-
tract had been made and where the Married Woman's Act supported the claim.
The nature of the property right which the insured acquires under the policy
will be referred to the law of the place of making. In Columbian National Life
Ins. Co. v. Welch,99 the United States District Court in determining the right
of the United States to distrain for taxes referred to the law of Ohio where the
policy had been delivered in order to fix the insured's right in the proceeds as
superior to the right of the beneficiaries.
The capacity of the parties to make the contract depends upon the law of
the place of making; thus the power of the insured's wife to apply family
income to the payment of premiums for insurance on her husband's life does
not depend upon the law of New York, when New York is the forum, if the con-
tracts were made in Ohio, a state that has different statutory limits with respect to
the amount of money that a wife may apply to insurance; see United States Mortgage
and Trust Co. v. Ruggles.100
A court will not apply local statutes to external matters; and it will not draw
to itself statutes of other states that pertain to procedure. A Rhode Island statute
permitting persons injured in automobile accidents to sue an insurer will not be
applied in Rhode Island to an insurer qualified in that state if the policy was
issued and the accident occurred in Masschusetts; see Corderre v. Travelers Ins.
Co.101 The Georgia courts will not follow a Florida statute whereby the designation
of the insured's estate as beneficiary makes the insurance payable to his wife
G Note 61.
96 123 A. D. 885, 108 N. Y. S. 431 (1908).
97 237 Mo. A. 939, 179 S.W.2d 484 (1944).
98 59 N. Y. 587 (1875).
99 15 F. Supp. 177, off. 88 F.2d 333 (1st. Cir. 1937).
100 258 N. Y. 32, 179 N. E. 250 (1932).
101 48 R. I. 152, 136 A. 305 (1927). See Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. McRee, 75 Fla. 257, 78 So.
22 (1918).
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and childem where the insured resided in Florida at the time the policy issued,
and removed later to Georgia and while resident there changed the beneficiary
to his estate; see Fenn v. Castelanna.0 2 The Rhode Island courts refused to give
the Rhode Island statute effect outside of the state; the Georgia courts refused
to draw into Georgia the administrative procedure of another state.
Penalties
Here the conflict theories are subordinate to substantive right and in a
much lesser degree to regulatory power.
Statutes that impose penalties on an insurer for vexatious delay in making
payment are not yet considered part of a state's regulatory practice. Up to now
penalty statutes have been given the status of substantive right; see Aetna Life
Insurance Co. v. Dunken, 10 8 in view of People of Sioux County v. National Surety
Co.,104 and Missouri State Life Insurance Co. v. Jones.105 In the Dunken case a
term policy, delivered in Tennessee, permitted a conversion to twenty payment
life. The insured, having moved to Texas, converted the policy. In an action on
the converted policy the Texas courts allowed the statutory penalty. The Supreme
Court of the United States reversed the judgment on the ground that the basic
contract had been made in Tennessee where no penalty was allowed. This rea-
soning refers the allowance of the penalty to the place of making. It is the
general rule. In Lowry v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Insurance Co.,' 06 Missouri en-
forced the Kansas penalty statute. In Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Carl-
.son,107 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Kansas penalty statute
did not apply in view of a finding that the policy was a New Jersey contract.
Martin v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York,108 presents the penalty
statutes in a different aspect. There Missouri applied its local penalty statute
to a claim on a life policy that was an Indiana contract. The court followed
the place of performance test there on the ground that vexatious delay con-
cerns performance and the law at the place of performance controls the recovery
of penalties. This impulse is an assertion of the state's regulatory power.
Texas exercises its regulatory power by a statute making insurance contracts
written by an insurer doing business in the state payable to a citizen or inhabitant
of Texas subject to Texas law. The statute contemplates a place of performance
test. The Supreme Court of the United States has held, however, that a group
insurance contract made in Pennsylvania is not subject to Texas law when the
delivery of a certificate under the policy is the only act done in Texas. In Boseman
102 196 Ga. 22, 25 S.E.2d 796 (1943).
108 Note 12.
104 276 U. S. 238, 48 Sup. Ct. 239, 72 L. Ed. 547 (1928).
105 290 U. S. 199, 54 Sup. Ct. 133, 78 L. Ed. 267 (1933).
106 219 Mo. A. 121, 272 S. W. 79 (1925).
107 126 F.2d 607 (loth. Cir. 1942).
108 190 Mo. A. 703, 176 S. W. 266 (1915).
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v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co.,10 9 a group policy that was delivered
in Pennsylvania and the premium there paid provided that the arrangement would
be controlled by the law of Pennsylvania. The policy fixed sixty days for a
notice of disability; the Texas statute allowed a period of ninety days. The Texas
courts followed the local statute. The United States Supreme Court reversed the
judgment on the ground that the insurer was not doing business in Texas since
the certificate is not a part of the insurance contract. Prior to the Boseman de-
cision the Texas courts had applied the penalty statute to group contracts of the
type tht Boseman case describes. In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Wann,110
the Texas Commission of Appeal overruled the prior decisions and adopted the
decision in the Boseman case as controlling sending the case back nevertheless
for a further trial in order to determine if the insurer was doing business in the
state.
The impulse to treat penalties as substantive rights has thus prevailed over
the impulse of regulation; the place of making has prevailed over the place of
performance.
Time has added other elements, however. The Supreme Court of the United
States later laid down the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,"1 whereby the final
word on the construction of an insurance contract rests with the state courts.
Congress in the enactment of Public Law 15,112 has placed a new emphasis
on not only the right of the states to regulate insurance but on the necessity of
the full exercise of the state power in order that the power of the Federal govern-
ment may not be called into being. These elements may yet throw the emphasis
in penalty cases back to the place of performance since neither Pennsylvania
nor New York can regulate the actions of an insurer in Texas.
Interpretation
Intent is here the decisive factor, the impulse of decision. The courts
usL the various conflict theories to create flexibility in the execution of the intent.
The law of a particular state may have factual significance in the search
for the intent. It may point to the intent and create, by itself, a rule of decision.
Distinctions in selecting the law vary with the issue-depend upon the issue.
The law of the place of making is relevant if the interpretation of the policy
is in issue; thus the Missouri courts determined the coverage of an accident clause
by referring to the law of California, where the contract had been made, and
whereby death, resulting from a hemorrhage caused by breaking the module
from a tumor while the insured was playing golf, was not an accident. 11
109 301 U. S. 196, 57 Sup. Ct. 686, 81 L. Ed. 1036 (1937).
110 109 S.W.2d 470. 115 A. L. R. 1301 (1937). See John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Stanley, 215 S.W.2d 416 (1948).
1M1 Note 1.
112 59 Stat. 33, 34; 15 U. S. C. 1011-1015. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408,
66 Sup. Ct. 1142, 90 L. Ed. 1342 (1946).
113 Campbell v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 283 Mo. 63, 222 S. W. 778, (1920).
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The policy may, however, show by its provisions a clear intent to refer
interpretation to the place of performance; thus the United States Supreme
Court considered the law of England in interpreting a marine insurance policy
in which the parti'es contemplated performance in England according to English
usages; see London Assurance Co. v. Companbia De Moagens DoBarreiro.1 14
Where the insured's intent is in issue-for example if the court is interpret-
ing a designation of beneficiary-the law of the insured's domicile may be
important. In Knights Templars and MasonicMut. Aid Association v. Greene,"56 a
resident of New York who directed an Ohio insurer to change the beneficial
designation to his "heirs" was deemed to have used the word "heirs" with
the meaning that the New York law gave to the word.
Where the insured's intent cannot be carried out except by a reference to
the law of the place of performance the courts will follow that concept of the
law if they realize thereby the insured's intent. In Re Hewitt,"16 the Ontario
courts had three choices of law-Manitoba, British Columbia, and Ontario. The
last will and testament that the insured soldier made, before sailing for France
where he fell, and whereby he sought to transfer the beneficial interest to his
wife, was ineffective for the purpose in British Columbia, the insured's last
domicile. The policy was payable at the insurer's home office in Ontario. The
Ontario law, which permitted the change to be made by will, was followed.
Manitoba where the insured resided when he took the policy was eliminated on
the ground that its statute made the policy payable there only if the insured lived
there and the soldier's last domicile was British Columbia.
Intent rather than conflict theories control interpretation; and the courts
exercise a free choice among conflict concepts in carrying out the intent.
Representations and Warranties
Issues of material misrepresentation relate to the process of contracting;
they generally draw in the application either for the insurance or for the re-
instatement of the insurance. 117 The courts have found little occasion to go
further than to determine the place of making. The one attempted diversity has
given firmer support to the place of making rule. The Supreme Court of the
United States in John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Yates,'18 extended
thL full faith and credit clause to a statute defining misrepresentation at the
place of making.
114 167 U. S. 149, 17 Sup. Ct. 785, 42 L. Ed. 113 (1897).
115 79 F. 461 (C. C. Ohio 1897).
116 43 D. L. R. 716 (1918).
117 The law controlling reinstatement is discussed ;n the following cases among many: Bottomley
v, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 170 Mass. 274, 49 N. E. 438 (1898). Chambers v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co.. 235 Mo. A. 884. 138 S.W.2d 29 (1940). Harris v. Ne, wYork Life Ins.
Co., 33 A.2d 154 (1943). National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Vaughn, 32 S.2d 490
(1947).
118 299 U. S. 178, 57 Sup. Ct. 129, 81 L. Ed. 106 (1936).
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In Washington National Insuran:e Co. v. Shaw,119 the Texas courts held
that the representations and concealments that occurred in the negotiation of
a policy in California were subject to the law of California respecting representa-
tion and concealment and that the residence of the beneficiary in Texas did not
bring the policy within the Texas statutes. Columbian National Life Insurance
Co. v. Lanigan,120 referred the effect of a medical examiner's entries on an ap-
plication that the insured had signed without reading to the law of Massachusetts
where the policy had been delivered and in the absence of proof of the Massachu-
setts law the Florida court applied the Florida law.
In the Lanigan case the effect of an agent's act is present. The attempt to
create a variation in the misrepresentation cases where the issues concerned an
agent's act had already failed in the Yates case. 121 There the trial court in Georgia
submitted to a jury an issue respecting the entry of false answers on the applica-
tion by the agent and charged that if the agent had knowledge of facts that
would have made the policy void the insurer could be deemed to have waived
the existence of such facts. Since the policy had been delivered in New York,
and since the agent's power concerned the making of the contract, there was
little if any need of departing from the law of the place of making. The Georgia
courts saw a distinction, however, since the effect of the agent's act depended
upon a jury finding on the facts and held that the point at issue related to the
remedy and, therefore, to the law of the forum. The Supreme Court of the United
States reversed. Finding that the New York statute, as interpreted by the New
York courts, charged the insured with knowledge of the application, if a copy
had been annexed to the policy., the Supreme Court of the United States gave
the New York statute the benefit of the full faith and credit clause.
Administration
A contract of insurance may be enforced in various forums since the insurer
becomes a debtor resident in many states by having qualified as a foreign insurer.
An issue respecting jurisdiction over assets appears to be no longer open under
the authorites 122
A policy may be payable or by circumstance may become payable to the
insured's estate. If the obligation is to be promptly discharged some forum must
designate an officer-an administrator-to receive the proceeds. Different states
may appoint administrators and two demands for payment may result. The in-
surer's obligation rests solely in contract. The ambiguity arises apart from the
contract; it arises from the appointive power ot different jurisdictions-there
thus arises by diverse claims of jurisdiction a literal conflict of laws.
119 Note 53.
120 154 Fla. 760, 19 S.2d 67 (1944).
121 Note 118.
122 New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Woodworth, iii U. S. 138, 4 Sup. Ct. 364, 28 L
Ed. 379 (1884).
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The difficulty arises from a failure to relate one of the administrative
powers to another. Although Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Vogel's Execu-
trix,1 28 is a testate proceeding it makes a perfect analysis of the problem, and finds
a solution in reconciliation of the respective state powers as dominant and ancillary;
and Judge Peckham suggested this solution as a reconciliation in Suliz v. Mut.
Res. Fund Life Association.
2 4
Professor Beale sought to solve the conflicting claims of the respective states
by treating the policy as a mercantile specialty whereby the policy acquires a
situs at the place where it is found. The instrument is thereby given a situs that
determines the controlling law. Weissman v. Banque De of Bruxelles, 125 is an ex-
ample of the rule. There a check deposited in a Bruxelles bank by a resident
of New York carried notice of a diversion of corporate funds when later collected
in the District of Columbia because such was the presumptioe law of the place of
the situs of the check at the time of collection.
Although this doctrine plays a part in the majority of the insurance cases
the courts have not accepted it with the unanimity necessary to create commercial
certainty. Pehaps the courts feel that the doctrine is an attempt at standardization
and does not release a necessary adaptive capacity.
If we apply the mercantile specialty doctrine we thereby obtain a situs but
a situs varying with circumstances. And situs, when taken by itself, is not an
ultimate. The courts at the situs must still point the payee out; see Riley v. New York
Trust Co.126 Situs thus creates in the insurance arrangement a variable factor
that the parties never contemplated.
Mayo v. Equitable Life Assurance Society121 does not reject situs as the test
since there the policies had been left in Mississippi for safe keeping and the
custody related back to thL insured's domicile in Virginia.
An early New York case indicated that the presence of the policy fixed the
situs. Holyoke v. Union Mutual Life Insurance Co.128 and Steele v. Connecticut
General Life Insurance Co.129 suggested, however, that the insured's domicile is the
situs of the policy. There a Connecticut insurer was required to pay the proceeds
of policies to a New York administrator when it had already paid the proceeds
to an ancillary administrator in Connecticut. The court held that the situs of the
policies was at the insured's domicile in New York and that the policies were assets
128 76 Ala. 441 (1884).
124 145 N. Y. 563, 40 N. E. 242 (1895).
125 254 N. Y. 488, 173 N. E. 835 (1930).
126 315 U. S. 343, 62 Sup. Ct. 608, 86 L. Ed. 885 (1942). Edwin W. Briggs. The Jurisdictional
128 315 U. S. 343, 62 Sup. Ct. 608, 86 L. Ed. 885 (1942). Edwin W. Briggs, The Juriedfctional
Choke of Law Relation In Conflicts Rules. 61 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1948).
12T 71 Miss. 590, 15 So. 791 (1894).
128 22 Hun 75, aff. 84 N. Y. 648 (1881).
129 31 A. D. 389, 52 N. Y. S. 373, aff. 160 N. Y. 703, 57 N. E. 1125 (1899).
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in New York since the insurer could be sued there--the policies were in the
insurer's possession in Connecticut as security for a loan.
In Sulz v. Mut. Res, Fund Life Association,i8 0 where the policy was in
Tacoma, Washington, the insured's residence at the time of his death, the court
refused to allow the insured's widow, who had New York letters, to proceed
with a suit in New York after an administrator appointed in Washington had
already sued. Here there was a reconciliation of the administrative process in
the two states. In Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Vogel's Executrix,13' the
Alabama courts, finding the policy in Alabama, preferred the executrix of an
insured resident in Alabama over the suggested powers of an administratrix in
New York, and reconciled the respective powers by pointing out that the New
York process was necessarily ancillary.
The courts have not been fortunate in adapting the conflict rules to ad-
ministration; they have not subordinated the conflict concepts to the reconciliation
of conflicting claims of power. The comparative lack of success here is perhaps
due to the conflicting claims of sovereign power.
The Harvard Law Review Note
In summarizing the discontent in theoretical thought I referred to a recent
note in the HARVARD LAW REVIEw, Validity of Spendthrift Restrictions in Life
Insurance Settlements; Choice of Law;8 2 now I shall review that note for the
purpose of drawing together in a summary way some of the current problems
in this field. The author of the note found only eleven cases of the spendthrift
trust type that involved conflict issues and found that but five of the cases
gave the conflicts problem careful consideration.
I shall review the note by arranging the eleven cases cited by the note
in a different pattern. Th- pattern I use comprises three categories: the rule in
180 Note 124.
181 Note 123.
182 Note 51. An analysis of the legal background of an option in respect to the payment of in-
surance proceeds has been made in many of the cases. I set out a few here. Contract Or trust:
McLaughlin v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the United States 112 N. J. Eq. 344, 164 A.
579 (1933). Pierowich v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 282 Mich. 118, 275 N. W. 789 (1937).
Federal Income Taxation: Commissioner v. Winslow, 113 F.2d 418 (1st. Cir. 1940):
Commissioner v. Pierce, 146 F.2d 388 (2nd. Cir. 1944); Thornley v. Commissioner, 2T.
C. 220 (1943) ; Hess v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 135 (Minn. 1947) : G. C. M. 21666-1940
-4-10148-Rev. Act. of 1934-C. B. 1940--1 page 16, modified by T. D. 5684 (1949).
The cases are set out here for the light they throw on insurance arrangements and not for the
purpose of stating the tax rules. State Taxation: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Beisel.
338 Pa. 519, 13 A.2d 419 (1940); Bronson v. Glander, 77 N.E.2d 471, 149 0. S.
57 (1948). Power to exercise: guardians--Latterman v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 280 N. Y.
338 Pa. 519, 13 At. (2d) 419 (1940); Bronson v. Glander, 77 N. E. (2d) 471, 149 0. S.
102, 19 N. E. (2d) 978 (1939); Kentucky, Ch. 111. Laws 1944, 1 (j); Committee--Pendas
v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States, 1.29 Fla. 253, 176 So. 104, 112 A. L. R. 1051
(1937); Trustee-First Trust Co. of Saint Paul v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 204
Minn. 244, 283 N. W. 236 (1939); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Valz, 141 F.2d 1014 (5th.
Cir.) (1944). Rule against perpetuties: Holmes v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 288 N.
Y. 106, 41 N.E.2d 909 (1942).
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Matter of Nires, spendthrift trusts, and conflict cases. Only three of the cases
will emerge from my pattern as conflict issues since I use a more comprehensive
approach.
Two of the cases that the note cites, New York Life Insurance Co. v. Beebe'89
and Miller v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co.,'8 4 are within the rule
cf Matter of Nires,'3 6 namely, that. the insurance arrangement is a contract.
Professor Scott has expressed the opinion that any distinction between con-
tract and trust is subordinate to other objectives; the note pursuing this thought
urges the necessity for recognizing the "significant claims."
The courts do not seek in these cases, however, idealistic results; they seek
a solution on more immediate data and especially the insured's intention; see New
England Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Harvey.18 6 It is the weight that is given to
intent that makes the concept of contract important here.
The courts will use various concepts including that of trusts if first of
all there is the necessary basis for an intention. Thus in the Beebe case, 813 the
parties after engaging in the litigation of rival claims to the proceeds of an
option arrangement and settling their differences sought to compel the insurer
to accept their settlement agreement in the place and instead of the arrangement
the insured had made with the insurer. The situation in the Miller case,' 8 8 was
similar; the primary and secondary beneficiaries had settled their litigation respect-
ing the successive designations that the insured had made. The respective courts
rejected the proposal of the litigants in each of the cases upon the rule in the
Matter of Nires.139
Six of the cases that the note cites, namely, Roth v. Kapowsky,"@ Holowaty
v. Prudential Insurance Co.,"' Mullen v. Trolinger,14 2 Provident Trust Co. v.
Rothman,148 Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Miller," and Tate v. Hain,145 were
133 57 F Supp. 754 (D. C. Md. 1944).
184 183 Md. 19, 36 A.2d 517 (1944).
185 290 N. Y. 78, 48 N.F.2d 268 (1943); 145 A. L. R. 1368; 56 HARV. L. Rav. 1147,
1152 (1943); 29 CORN. L. Q. 120 (1943); 42 MrcH. L. REV. 344 (1943); 18 Sr. JOHNS
L. REV. 68 (1943). Nine years before the Nires case the court had decided Crossman v. Rauch,
263 N. Y. 264, 188 N. E. 748 (1934). § 17 of the New York Personal Property Law was
amended in 1945 so as to permit the application of interest in certain initances to an in-
fant's needs. Ch. 828, L. 1945. 59 HARv. L. REv. 629 (1946). The effect of 15 on claims
for taxes is discussed in Matte rof Rosenberg, 269 N. Y. 247, 199 N.E.2d 206 (t935).
Matter of Genesee Valley Trust Co. v. Glazer, 295 N. Y. 219, 66 N.E.2d 169 (1946)
discusses withdrawals from the fund.




140 393 Ill. 484, 66 N.E.2d 664 (1946).






cases where the spendthrift trust concept was in issue and creditors were claiming
rights in the insurance proceeds. In some of these cases we find the courts using
a trust concept for the purpose of executing a contract. Thus in the Holowaty'"
and Mullin147 cases the court carried out the directions of the insured given
in the insurance arrangement and preferred the payees named in the contract
by using the trust concept as an analogical refenrence. In the Roth" 8 and Roth-
man 19 cases the courts had the benefit of a statute directed to restrictions in in-
surance arrangements. In Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Miller,150 and Tate v. Hain, 1 1
the New York and Virginia courts respectively reached into New York to find
statutory authority for executing the insured's direction that the payee have
preference. In the Miller case,152 the insured was a resident of Connecticut; in
Tate v. Hain, 6 the insured was a resident of South Carolina. Yet in each case
tht process the court used in reaching a decision was a search for the insured's
intent and thereby the decisive issue became a question of fact.
Three cases of the eleven cited in the note passed upon a conflict of laws-
Chelsea-Wheeler Coal Co. v. Marvin,'" Foley v. Foley,1" and Annis v. Pilke-
wtiz.156 The court in the Marvin case affirmed the holding of an intermediate
court that the law of the state where the policy had been delivered rather than
the law of the state of the insurer's domicile determined the validity of the
payee's assignment of the proceeds. The court found the restraint in the settle-
ment arrangement valid by referring to a statute permitting a like restraint
in trust arrangements. In Foley v. Foley,15 7 a New York judgment creditor, the
insured's wife, was allowed to garnishee in New York the available surrender
values of policies that had been delivered in Pennsylvania to a resident of that
state. The court held that exemptions depend on the law of the forum since
exemptions concern the remedy. In Annis v. Pilkewitz,15" tht court did not
relate the exemptions to the law of the forum because the insurance arrange-
ment expressly referred the performance of the contract and the remedy to the
law of New York.
In John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 159 the place of making
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misrepresentation; in Annis v. Pilkewitz,260 the place of performance drew in
the New York statute, relating to insurance, trust, or other arrangement to de-
termine title to the proceeds,
Adaptation creates not a simple but a severe code. This severer code remains
a code; adaptation does not signify the absence of form. The selection of principles
in relation to facts that have been analyzed as to relevancy, and in the light of
considered consequences, does not result in chaos. The emphasis is on the applica-
tion of knowledge. The use of the tools in a creative way exceeds the value of
the knowledge of the tools alone. Adaptation in the conflicts field of tha law
is the counterpart of character, responsibility, skill, courage and initative in an
order of free enterprise.
160 Note 92.
